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1 In an earlier work titled Subversion et Subvention (1994), Rainer Rochlitz was embroiled in
the debate about contemporary art, and had appraised the works in question, the authors
involved, and the general state of the art arena and the manifestations thereof which
were at that time on view. In his book he lamented the resignation of criticism caused, in
his view, both by institutional pressures and the habits of “art’s self-proclamation since
Duchamp,  bolstered  by  theories  such  as  those  of  Nelson  Goodman,  who  defines  art
independently of any idea of ‘quality’.” (p.60). 
2 With  L’Art  au  banc  d’essai:  esthétique  et  critique,  Rochlitz  keeps  his  distance  from the
everyday interests of the art arena and lays the bases of a “reconstructive and critical”
aesthetics. Rochlitz suggests a remedy for the lawlessness of taste to the non-philosopher
reader who raises questions about the motivations and purposes of this undertaking, and
to  anyone  who  wonders  what  necessity  peculiar  to  the  general  development  of
philosophy, or to the interrogation of certain fundamental concepts, might call for an
aggiornamento,  or alternatively what transformation of  artistic praxis and its  place in
society might require that the available concepts be rethought. His book, which is based
on a division between “aesthetic principles” and “didactic analyses”, does not, in the first
part anyway, shed philosophical arguments. In the second part, devoted to the works of
Don DeLilo and Jean Echenoz where literature is concerned, and Gerhard Richter and Jeff
Wall where the visual arts are concerned, it is intent on illustrating in an exemplary way
its  “angles  of  problematization”.  A  reading  of  it  gradually  reveals  what  is  brutally
declared by the review slip: Rochlitz has appointed himself the task of refuting a “liberal
and, by nature, empirical” aesthetics, formulated over the past few decades by Nelson
Goodman, Arthur Danto and Gérard Genette. This aesthetics is typified by the attention it
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affords the Transfiguration du banal (Danto, 1989), and, inter alia, the posterity of Marcel
Duchamp in 20th century art (Goodman, Genette), hitherto out of reach, or more or less
inaccessible to philosophers and aestheticians. This is where the rub would appear to lie:
it is pertinent to refute philosophers who allow refection about the art in which Rochlitz
does not believe, and thus reinstate values that have been forgotten, lost or threatened by
the consequences of a globalization of culture.
3 Rochlitz considers that any work of art is a candidate for recognition as such, that the
professional  processes  of  approval  (by  training)  no longer  exist,  and  that  empiricist
aesthetics offers no resistance to the selections of the institution. He replaces this by
many kinds of certifying authorities which must pronounce themselves on works and
artists alike. This plurality of authorities and reasoned verdicts might have given rise to
an (expected) description, for debates about contemporary art have, rightly or wrongly,
had a marked effect in France and elsewhere, by way of the feeling of an institutional
monolithism which is rarely contradicted by other authorities, such as criticism and the
market.  This  was  not  Rochlitz’s  option,  however.  Rather,  he  has  endeavoured  to
invalidate open reflection about the system of autographical and allographical works,
nevertheless perceived as something very positive by visual artists who are captives of
representations of the artwork limited to a system that is less and less compatible with
their praxis and the reality of methods of disseminating contemporary culture. It is a
matter of showing that the semiotic characteristics considered by Goodman fail to define
the specificity of the artwork by overlooking the claim of intersubjective recognition.
This complement of common sense does admittedly go hand in hand with an attempt to
thoroughly discredit the dissociation between ideal immanence and physical immanence
(reformulation by Genette of the Goodmanian contrast) by the introduction of the notion
of abode which would make it possible to preserve a work not concerned by the system
issue. Rochlitz is of the view that it is only possible to broach aesthetic knowledge “from
the performative standpoint of one taking part in aesthetic and artistic life”, and that the
purpose, first and foremost, of this knowledge is to recognize good works. Having singled
out assertive and descriptive knowledge with a bearing on the objective world, and the
normative  knowledge  attaching  to  the  social  world,  Rochlitz  does  acknowledge  the
“particular” role played by works of art vis-à-vis the different aspects of the subjective
world, but he points out: “The subjective world that is likely to be divided shows this
analogy with the social world which is thus only fully accessible to it from the standpoint
of someone taking part in the ‘game’, which is here artistic” (p. 102). Rochlitz does not
admit the dissociation by Goodman of what is accessible to knowledge and of what might
stem from a receptive diversity that is in some ways out of control. Goodman actually
reverts  to  thinking  that,  despite  its  public  status,  which  Rochlitz  recognizes  with
Goodman,  the  work  is  only  accessible  from  within  the  aesthetic  field,  where  the
contradictory  but  competent  opinions  of  critics  end  up  by  producing  a  consensus,
henceforth with universal or almost-universal values. The idea thus comes to the fore
that the critical debate gradually constructs the value and the sound reading of works,
and, in every aspect, our author prefers the albeit contradictory opinion of experts to the
idiosyncrasy of individual readings.
4 Refutation is thus put forward as the major objective in the chapter devoted to critical
judgements, with an attempt to salvage among those very people whom Goodman and
others have criticized—such as Beardsley, for example—something with which to shore
up a legitimate dismantling of their reasoning. This manoeuvre is not very profitable and
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much not very “effectual” effort is made to borrow a judgemental criterion developed by
Rochlitz.  These didactic  analyses  are  restricted to demonstrating how the occasional
critic and the philosopher can soundly adjudge things and separate the wheat from the
chaff, including among those artists who have authority. The philosopher of the critical
debate arranges the opinions he contradicts in the practice of the critical exercise, when
he  perseveres  beyond  the  call  of  duty  in  his  role  of  one  contradicting  empiricist
aesthetics.
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